Calculating risk for novel technologies is really hard--arguably more art than science. I think requiring that any human space access systems be autonomously tested end-to-end a certain number of times before the first humans are on board (for an end-to-end flight) is the safest and most reliable way to properly assess risk. If you can't test autonomously, then human failability must be added to the risk assessment, and there simply isn't enough aggregate data to make such a calculation anything but a guess.Is it literally rocket science when setting a safety standard for rocket science, or just common sense?
Set up a regulatory regime based on targets, defining what must be achieved as a level of residual risk; rather than a rule setting regulator that defines how things must be done and built. Require a safety case with a third party audit, from NASA initially but eventually from other approved bodies that are able to give equivalent independent review.
The recent Titan submarine is an example of the deficiency of relying on just "informed consent".
See this seems like what we are trying to avoid. We don't require that for aircraft - lose all engines over the ocean in a passenger jet and you will ditch. If the overall system is reliable enough, it shouldn't be necessary to specify how that is achieved.
Without the freedom to innovate (TM), OceanGate would never have been able to produce the Titan submersible. It would be a shame if space flight was similarly hampered. (I don't need a satirical emoticon here I hope.)Only in the US... regulations banning regulations, putting commercial interests over human lives.
Actually we do require that for aircraft. The blackbox is a regulatory requirement, and even if you don't actually total the aircraft, any near miss requires that the box be sent off for analysis and an investigation opened. Most of these investigations lead to recommendations for the pilotes, the airlines and/or the aircraft manufacturer which are then applied.See this seems like what we are trying to avoid. We don't require that for aircraft - lose all engines over the ocean in a passenger jet and you will ditch. If the overall system is reliable enough, it shouldn't be necessary to specify how that is achieved.
The billionaire oneIn what universe is a ban on safety regulations a good thing?
I can't wait for the people who've killed two dozen astronauts to write the regulations for the people who've killed nobody.
US human spaceflight missions have, to date, about a 1 percent fatal accident rate (four of around 400 crew missions have resulted in fatalities).
If anyone has lobbying muscle it's the military industrial complex and look at SpaceX. They have basically crushed all those lobbying competitors because their products actually work and it's very hard to lobby against that.On the other hand, I have no doubt that lobbying, regulatory capture, and congressional abuse of power could lead to laws passed specifically to inhibit specific companies.
That's generally how safety regulations work. You either learn from past mistakes (yours, or someone else's), or you repeat them. Learning from someone else's mistakes is a lot cheaper and easier.I can't wait for the people who've killed two dozen astronauts to write the regulations for the people who've killed nobody.
First of all, most commercial passenger plans flying flights across oceans are pretty well all twin engined, and subject to ETOPS in order to be allowed to do so.See this seems like what we are trying to avoid. We don't require that for aircraft - lose all engines over the ocean in a passenger jet and you will ditch. If the overall system is reliable enough, it shouldn't be necessary to specify how that is achieved.
ETOPS (/iːˈtɒps/) is an acronym for Extended-range Twin-engine Operations Performance Standards—a special part of flight rules for one-engine-inoperative flight conditions. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) coined the acronym for twin-engine aircraft operation in airspace further than one hour from a diversion airport at the one-engine-inoperative cruise speed, over water or remote lands, or on routes previously restricted to three- and four-engine aircraft.[1]
In 2016, the ICAO adopted a standard that, by November 2018, all aircraft over open ocean report their position every 15 minutes.[370] In March, the ICAO approved an amendment to the Chicago Convention requiring new aircraft manufactured after 1 January 2021 to have autonomous tracking devices which could send location information at least once per minute in distress circumstances
I'm usually a big fan of Ars' editorial slant, and I absolutely love the focus and deep dives on space flight, but there's always been a glaring undercurrent of...fanboyism in relation to private entities.I am baffled by the tone of this article. It seems to be pretty strongly implying, without actually saying, that this ban on safety regulations is good and it's a problem that it might expire. And yet the only arguments it presents for that position is 'this person who works for one of the companies that might someday be required to value the safety of human beings thinks they shouldn't have to because waves arms dramatically innovation!'.
The irony being that OceabGate could have submitted their design for certification by an industry body setup by the companies involved in deep sea exploration, but chose not to. What we've been hearing since the incident is that certification is that such certification would most likely have been denied as numerous knowledgeable individuals in the field had concerns over the design and materials.Without the freedom to innovate (TM), OceanGate would never have been able to produce the Titan submersible. It would be a shame if space flight was similarly hampered. (I don't need a satirical emoticon here I hope.)
"Certification is the crucible within which responsible innovation is possible." -- Patrick Lahey, President, Triton Submarines
I can't wait for the people who've killed two dozen astronauts to write the regulations for the people who've killed nobody.
And the reason that ditching over the ocean is possible is because there's requirements for preparedness in case of loss of all engines, designs to be able to control the plane, etc. There's SO many rules and regulations for aircraft that even if they lose all their engines there still have to be MORE backup systems to ensure basic flight controls, radios, etc. continue functioning for a minimum amount of time, giving them an opportunity to save it with a controlled ditching/landing.See this seems like what we are trying to avoid. We don't require that for aircraft - lose all engines over the ocean in a passenger jet and you will ditch. If the overall system is reliable enough, it shouldn't be necessary to specify how that is achieved.